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Abstract
Meeting confidentiality requirements in software systems is vital for organizations. Considering confi-
dentiality in early development phases such as the architectural design phase is beneficial compared to
late phases such as the implementation because fixing design issues is more cost-efficient in early phases.
This tutorial introduces an approach for modeling and statically analyzing confidentiality in software
architectures within the Palladio tool suite. Besides foundational knowledge, the tutorial provides a
practical hands-on session using the tool. The goal is to show that it is already possible to consider
confidentiality in the early design process and that this consideration can be integrated into existing
architectural design tools.
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1. Motivation
The importance of security in software sys-
tems continuously increases together with
the connectedness of systems and legal obli-
gations. Breaches of confidentiality, which is
an aspect of security, have a significant im-
pact on business because of a loss of busi-
ness value [1] or high fines [2, 3]. Addition-
ally, many users are willing to change a ser-
vice provider to increase the confidentiality
of their data [4]. Therefore, protecting data
confidentiality is vital for organizations.
It is necessary to consider confidentiality
in all development phases and as early as
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possible, because many violations trace back
to the software design [5, 6], which also in-
cludes early designs such as software archi-
tectures. To avoid high effort for later fixes,
it is necessary to already identify and address
these issues in the software architecture [7].
Even if this line of arguments is clear or even
obvious to many, there is still a low adoption
of security tools during the software design
or architecture [8, 9, 10, 11]. There are var-
ious reasons to this low adoption but miss-
ing awareness and integration into existing
workflows are two of them.
The goal of the tutorial is to raise aware-
ness and to make clear that approaches,
which blend into existing tools and pro-
cesses, exist. We would like to show this by
presenting our confidentiality modeling and
analysis approach integrated into the Palla-
dio tool suite [12]. The Palladio integration
extends the modeling language by means for
expressing data processing. A automated
transformation translates the Palladio model
into an analysis model that determines rel-
evant data properties by simulating the ef-
fect of data processing on data. Eventually,
data properties are compared with expected
properties and the identified problems are re-
ported back to the user.
2. Tutorial Overview
In this tutorial, we show how static analy-
ses of software architectures can reveal vio-
lations of access control policies. The threats
considered in the analyses are that the soft-
ware architecture itself violates such policies
by its structure, behavior, deployment or in-
tended usage.
The tutorial is built around our modeling
and analysis approach [13, 14]. The approach
is integrated into the Palladio tool suite [12]
and makes use of recently introduced data-
oriented interfaces [15]. The approach has
already been used in various contexts, so we
consider it mature enough for the presenta-
tion as part of the tutorial. For instance, the
approach has been used to identify read and
written data as part of an alignment process
between business processes and software ar-
chitectures focused on access rights [16, 17]
as well as for deriving properties of processed
data that can speed up runtime analyses [18].
The tutorial consists of three parts: First,
we introduce the modeling concepts to repre-
sent system behavior that can be analyzed for
access control later. This includes a hands-on
session on modeling using our Palladio tool-
ing. Second, we explain how to formulate
an access control analysis using a previously
published domain-specific language [19] and
how to interpret the results. Again, this in-
cludes a hands-on session on analyzing the
previously modeled system using our Palla-
dio tooling. We recap all required founda-
tional knowledge, so no expertise on security
or Palladio is required. Third, we will briefly
recap the contents of the tutorial, give an out-
look on ideas and first results of future work.
3. Tutorial Material
The tutorial will use slides, ready to use Palla-
dio tooling and example models. All material
will be published on the companion website
of the tutorial1 and in a data set [20].
The example discussed in the tutorial is the
TravelPlanner system known from the iFlow
approach [21]. The interactions in the sys-
tem are visualized by the sequence diagram
in Figure 1. Simply said, a user looks for
a flight and books the flight by additionally
passing credit card information (ccd) to the
system. The system consists of the smart-
phone apps TravelPlanner and CreditCard-
Center. The travel planner mediates between
the user and a travel agency, as well as an air-
line. The credit card center safely stores the
credit card information of the user. The Trav-
elAgency supports the search for flights and
receives a comission from the airline after a
booking. The Airline provides information
about flights and supports booking flights. In
the corresponding publication [21], the con-
fidentiality requirement is given by an in-
formation flow policy. Transmitted data has
a classification level and participants have a
clearance level. The levels are {User, Airline,
TravelAgency}, {User, Airline} and {User} in as-
cending order. The requirement is that no
data must receive at a participant, which has
a clearance level lower than the classifica-
tion level of the data. In the example, the
critical part is the transmission of the credit
card information, which is classified as User,
to the airline, which only has a clearance
{User,Airline}.
In the tutorial, we use a modified version
of the scenario described before, which we


















Figure 1: UML sequence diagram illustrating the TravelPlanner system.
[13]. Instead of an information flow pol-
icy, we formulate the confidentiality require-
ments in terms of Role-based Access Con-
trol (RBAC). Participants have roles instead
of clearance levels and data have associated
access rights in terms of roles. The roles are
User, TravelAgency and Airline. The require-
ment is that the intersection between the ac-
cess rights of data and the roles of a partic-
ipant must not be empty. Again, the critical
part is that credit card data is only accessible
to the user but it is sent to the airline during
the booking.
In both examples, it is possible to explicitly
release the credit card information on behalf
of the user. This action reduces the classifica-
tion level or add the Airline role, respectively.
The analysis to be defined during the tutorial,
detects the violation of the access control pol-
icy if the credit card information is passed to
the airline without previous release. A miss-
ing call to the release service implies an error
in the planned behavior of the architecture
and has to be fixed.
4. Future Work
We already discovered several interesting ar-
eas for further research: Architecture-level
confidentiality analyses are affected by un-
certainty due to abstraction and lack of in-
formation at design time. Therefore, we plan
to make uncertainty explicit while modeling,
refining and analyzing access control policies
[22]. A considerable source of uncertainty
is implied by the execution context of the
system under analysis. Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to identify and consider relevant as-
pects of the context [23]. Additional, mali-
cious users or attackers could exist. These
could exploit vulnerabilities or policies and
therefore should be considered in the future.
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